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UNCERTAINTY ANI) (W'I1MAL POLICY
INTENSITY IN FISCAL AND INCOMES POLICIES
BY FRANKliN R.SHUPP*
Two simple linear difference equation models are used to illustrate the effect of uncertainty on optimal
fiscal and incomes policy behavior. Whether uncertainty induces more, less, or equally vigorous responses
than those of the corresponding deterministic models is shown to depend on both the location of the
uncertainly in the underlying linear models and she structure of the criterion functions.
In particular the more complex criterion function characteristic of the incomes policy model gives rise
to conclusions regarding relative policy intensity which are quite dissimilar tothose obtained for fiscal
policy. The conditions under which these conclusions hold for both the fiscal and incomes rolIe' models
are derived using control theory. Finally, some simulationresults are presented to provide a feel for the
quantitative importance of the study's findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
A great deal of study has recently been devoted to therelationship between
uncertainty and optimal macroeconomic stabilization policies. At leastfour
questions have been identified and explored.(1) Given both additive and multi-
plicative uncertainty, is the system (macro model) inherentlystabilizabk? Assum-
ing a satisfactory answer to this existence query, threeother questions can be
posed. (2) Does the existence of uncertainty influence thesuitable choice of policy
instruments? (3) Does the optimal policy derived for a stochasticmodel yield a
significant welfare gain over the policy appropriate to thecorresponding deter-
ministic model? and (4) How does uncertainty affect the intensity orvigor with
which a particular policy should be employed?
While these last three questions are interrelated andhave, in fact, been
jointly discussed (see e.g. Turnovsky [8]) this paperfocuses more or less exclu-
sively on the final question, with the intent of clarifyingand extending the studies
of Aoki [1], Brainard [3], Chow [4, 5] and Wonham [9].
The two models considered in this study, one a simplefiscal policy model and
the other a simple wage-price control model, areof the same general linear-
quadratic form given by
(TI'-2- Mm D = E q,x1 +Six1Ui+riUJ'.
Subject to
(2) i1+i =â1x1+b,u,+E,
where x1 defines the state of the system at time tand u, represents the policy
variable. The mean and the variance of the stochasticcoefficients a1,b,and E are
*The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Hans Brems,Alan Rakton, Bryan
Stanhouse and Thomas Yancey.
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(1)assumed to be known and the random coefficients themselvesto he temporally
independent although possibly jointlydistributed. Furthermoretheparameteis a,,b1andrare assumed to be strictly positive.
In the more conventional fiscal policy model, the inner productterm ofu assumed to vanish, i.e. s0. In this event the paper's findingscan be summarized
as (I) if the uncertainty is additive, i.e. restricted to the c, term, thefirst period certainty equivalence theorem holds,(ii)if the noise ismultiplicative and
restricted to the coefficient of the policy variable, i.e. tob., a lessvigorous (than the
certainty equivalent) policy is indicated, (iii) if the uncertaintyis multiplicajvand restricted to the coefficient of the state variable, i.e.to a,, a more vigorouspolicy is implied. While these results are not inconsistent with thoseobtained in thestudies cited, Chow and Turnovsky in particularappear to follow Brainard'slead in attributing anyoverallincrease in policy response tocovariation between ã,and
(or t and E, in Brainard's analysis), rather thanto conclusion (iii) above.Since this result is independent of any covariation itrepresents a separate cause
For optimization studies in which the innerproduct term playsan essential role, i.e. in whichs0, these findings must be modified.Ifs <0, as in theincomes policy model outlined below, findings (i) and (iii)survive intact. However,in this new situation, the impact of noise restricted to the policyvariable coefficient isno longer unambiguous. In fact, for theparticular wage-price controlmodel COflSj- dered it is possible to establish that, forcertain plausible values ofs,the indicated policy response is less vigorous than thecertainty equivalent policy (asabove), but for certain other almost equally plausiblevalues of s, the indicatedpolicy response is more vigorous.
When s> 0, the policy implicationsof uncertainty areeven more qualified
although again not indeterminate. Inthis situation uncertaintyrestricted either to a, orb, can induce eithermore or less vigorous policyresponses than the certainty equivalent ones dependingon the relative values of theparameters a, b,r and s.
II. TUE FISCAL POLICY MODEL
To illustrate the impactof uncertainty on optimalpolicy decisions we first examine a rather standard singleequation macro model in whichhere is no long term growth, and in whichconsumption demand in any periodC is related to that period's nationalincome Y,, and investmentdemand tis given autono- mously. The demand forgovernment expenditures G,' is assumedto consist of two components; G*, thelong run equilibrium levelof expenditure which is consistent with the desiredpublicprivate expenditure mixand is given autonom- ously, andg,, the level of planned (demanded)expenditures for stabilization purposes.'
'We assume implicitlythatis the only policy variableand also that G can be given assome fraction of the full (high)employment national incomeY', i.e. G =k Y,and that the prevailing las structure generates receiptsequal to G at the fullemployment national income. We alsoassume that the given consumptionand investment functionsare consistent with this tax structure, which is assumed invariant and thereforenot a policy option.




Supply is assumed to respond to aggregate excess demand and is thus given by
=Y,[(C+t+G)= Yll,
where 0< 1 and denotes the response coefficient. Combining the supply and




From (5) we conclude that if g,=0, a,<I, and the coefficientsa,,,and y, are
time invariant, the long run equilibrium national income Y' is given by
a,+y,+G'
1=p,
Furthermore we assume that the price mechanism, defined to include interest and
wage rate adjustments, operates to insure that long run equilibrium consumerand
investor behavior is consistent with a full (high) employment national income.
That is, we assume that when the parameters of the system take on their long run
equilibrium values (i.e. when a,= a*, 13f3* andy,=*) fora sustained period,
the induced Y' is the full employment or targeted national incomeY*, where
1*
This implies that the targeted national income is not only consistentwith the
model, but also that the stabilization problem is essentially a disequilibrium one
and arises only when 'short run' behavior deviates from long runequilibrium
behavior.









Finally, to complete our model we assume we wish tominimize social
disutility as measured by the quadratic function
T+1 T
(6) D= (I
227Ifa, = ,tXy, = 0 for the planning horizonand for the immediate
preceding periods, then no corrective stabihzationpolicy is necessary. Howcve
j this is not the case and if the trajectories of thesevariables, or alternativelyof a,, b, and c,, are known with certainty, the problemcan be solved by a straightforw
application of dynamic programmingor the Maximum Principle.
We now assume that the trajectoriesa,, b, and c, arc given onlystochastically, with known means and variances. An explicitanalytic solution is available,using the same techniques, if the random coefficients(variables) are assumedtempor.. ally independent. The stochastic problemcan be restated as
MinD=E{4+.rg} L,-1 2
subject to
= a,, + !, -f






In the final equation abovewe have assumed solely for the sake ofexposition that there is no covariation betweena,, b,, and4This assumption is relaxedin the
more Comprehensive formulation includedin the appendix.
The general solutionto the problem defined by (7), (8)and (9) can be derived
from the appendix and is ofthe form





g1 = - -__
{(b1 + r)( 1++ (r) + r}(b1 ++ r)
I-laying established thestructure of the optimal policyrule, we return now to our Drimary concern whichis to Study the impactof uncertaintyon optimal policy behavior. To do thiswe examine the policyrule given by (12), bearingin mind that while the general formof this rule is timeinvariant, the precise specificationis not.
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I and k,1 = 0, then
+CT!)+aTbJT(+f)We consider first the impact of uncertainty associated with the additive term
c, and measured by the variance LT,. We note thatcrdoes not appear in the policy
rule given by (12). We conclude from this that additive uncertainty does not
influence the optimal policy decision. Indeed, if we assume that a- = o = 0, then
the policy rule of (12) reduces to
b11(b1+r+a1r)(c1yr_1+Ej1)+a1b7rr
(Lg- b1(h1 +2r+a_1r)+r2
This result is identical to the corresponding certainty solution except that T and
replace CT and CTrespectively, and as such implies first period certainty
equivalence.
We next address the case in which uncertainty is associated with the response
of the economy to the stabilization measure, which implies thatb,is known only





which can be rewritten as
(14') g71 = VIYTI - V2Cr_1 - P3CT.
To examine the impact of this form of uncertainty we differentiate thecoefficient




- [(b2 + cr) (b ++ r + a 2r + a22}+ r(h ++ r)}2
<0.
The implication of this is immediate.Celeris paribus,any increase in the uncer-
tainty ofb,reduces the intensity of the corrective action associated with anygiven
GNP gap.
We next consider the situation in which o == 0. i.e. in which only the
state variable parameter, à, is stochastic.Under these circumstances equation
(12) reduces to
{(b,+r)(1 fcr)+ ã_Ir}bT_I(ãy7_I+Ci)+ 1b,C,c
gT-1 - - I 'I- b1{(b1 + r)(1 +cr) + ãr} + r(b_i +r)
which can also be rewritten as
(16') g_ = .L1 1k2 C,i - ILiC'u.
To measure the impact of this type of uncertainty, wediflerenti ate the coefficient





(b-_1 +o){bi+u+2r+a1(o+r)}+r2Again the implication is clear. ('dens paribus, uncertaintyassociated with the
parameter a, increases the vigor or intensity of optimal correctivemeasures associated with any specific GNP gap. This somewhat unexpectedCOflClsjo
appears to warrant further examination.
If r >0, the optimal deterministic policy of period t does not closeentirely the
GNP gap in period t+ 1. While a further reduction in the GNPgap would be
beneficial, the marginal costs in terms of the more intensive policyrequired to
reduce the gap further would more than offset the marginalpotential benefits.
When a stochastic element is introduced into the ây, term,a further benefit
accrues however which upsets this deterministic equilibrium. Thisadditional
benefit derives from a reduction in the uncertainty in period 1+2,i.e. in a, which
as we have noted in (9) above is a concomitant of any reduction in theabsolute
value of y,41. Consequently, cetenis paribas a more intensivestabilization policy is
required to achieve the stochastic equilibrium. We note thatthis result depends
crucially on the dynamic nature of the model and theeminently reasonable
assumption that r>0.
In surnmaQi then we have demonstrated that uncertaintyassociated with the
parameters a,, b,, and E, in our fiscal policy model tends to induceoptimal policy
responses which are respectively of greater, lesser and equalintensity than the
corresponding optimal deterministic policies. This conclusionrequires that a, and
b, are both positive.
III. TimINCOMFSPOLICY MoI)EI.
In this section policy rules fora temporary incomes policy are identified and
e'camined. These rules are optimal withrespect to the posited criterion function
and a simple but plausible wage-priceinflation model. The principalassumption
of the underlying model is that the relevantinflation is sustained byan inflationary
psychology, characterized by expectationsof continuing price and wage increases.
Temporary wage-price controls bydampening these expectationsserve to reduce
the inflation.
The inflation model considered isa rather conventional two equation system,
consisting of a wage formationequation and a price formation equation: Money
wage increases Vi, are assumed to be relatedto expected price increases P,
average productivity increases W, andlagged excess demand for laboras
measured by the difference betweenthe prevailing unemploymentrate U,1 and the targeted unemploymentrate U1. This relationship is given in equation (18)
below with all variablesexpressed in percentage termsas
If we make the additionalassumption that expected price increasesare related to
past price changes P, as given by
P=h(P,_i+dp,2+d2p,3.),
where0</i <I and d=1 - h, we canuse a Koyck transformation to obtain the
following wage (increase)formation equation
W,+1=d W,+hp, + W1 dW+q(U, U,)r,d(1J,1- Un).
230On the other hand, priceincreasesare assumed to be related to increases in
average unit laboi costs, W, -- W. and to aggregate excess demand, 1' -
where Y equals the output defined by operating at the targeted unemployment
rate U' and the targeted capital capacity level. A closed economy is assumed in
the sense that no allowance is made for disproportionate exogenous price
increases, If we assume, in addition, that the relationship between price changes
and past wage changes follows a Koyck lag structure, it follows that
P,=b(%_+a_2+a213+..
where 0< b<1 and a=1b. This implies the price formation equation,
P11=aP1+bW1w(Y1-- Y)a(Y - Y).
It is evident from (20) and (22) that the inflationary process defined in this
study is self-feeding, i.e. is characterized by a wage-price spiral, and furthermore
that this process can be interrupted only by (i) a substantial increase in either or
both the unemployment gap U1 - U and the deflationary gap Y' - Y1, or by (ii)
wage-price controls which negate either the wage formation equation (20) or the
price formation equation (22). We note also that the system given by (20) and (22)
is capable of generating an unstable wage-price spiral, i.e., one characterized by a
continuing escalation in the rate of increase (decrease) of prices and wages.
However, if the system is constrained so that U,U and 1',=Y,t=(1, 2..
the wage-price spiral is not only stable, but the equilibrium values of P, and W,
depend only on the initial values of those same variables.
In the analysis which follows we assume that the system is so constrained, i.e.
that the economy is operating at the target levels of output and employment either
with or without the assistance of monetary and fiscal policies. Consequently, the
final two terms on the r.h.s. of equations (20) and (22) can be eliminated, and the
inflation is thus sustained only by inflationary expectations. In this situation wage
and/or price controls are designed to combat the inflation by altering these
expectations. We assume further that direct wage controls are imposed; in which
case the inflation model reduces to
P,1=aP,fbW,
where %V,W, - W and represents the policy or control variable, while P, is
determined in the market.
A good incomes policy must provide for (i) the elimination of price inflation
or at least its reduction to some acceptable level, (ii) an equitable distribution of
any restraining impact on wages, interest rates, and profits, (iii) terminal charac-
teristics which minimize the possibility of the reintroduction of a continually
escalating wage-price spiial once controls are suspended. This last objective
requires that the terminal price expectation P+1 is equal to the targeted level of
price increase F", which may or may not be equal to zero. A criterion function
constructed to achieve these three objectives when it is minimized is given by
T
D={piIP,_P*l+IW,_(W+Pt)I}+p2!P+I_P*t.
231A formal statement of the control problem requiresone athlitional observa
tion.The terminal condition as given by the third term of(24) isexpressed in terms
of theexpectedprice increase P1which is itself determined bya price increase
trajectory asperequation (19). Thisrelationshippermits US to combinethefirst
andthird terms of(24)and to rewrite the criterionfunction as
D=pcJP,_P*+I(W1_ %V)P
(1'i) wherep,p1+hd p2fort=(l,2.....1).
Finally we find it convenient to replace the absolutevalue form of the
criterion function (25) with the mathematicallymore tractable quadraticstructure of (2). If we simultaneously set P0 and normalize on thestate vector
coefficient we can rewrite (25) as
D=
where s,=r.
Minimizing (26) subject to (23) yieldsa variable coef Icientpolicyrule of the form
Wt0:Pt+W,
where Os 0,1 and where0 -I asI -+T This provides fora reasonable 'reentry' into the market.




whereis assumed to be temporallyindependent and to havea zero mean. From the appendixwe see that if we excludeany covariation, the general form of the solutionto the problem given by (28)and (29) is
= äbK, -- s,
(b+ffb)K,I -fr,
Assuming for expositionalpurposes that s and r are time invariant,and also that KT+I=I, it follows from (30)that for the final twoperiods,
3 = a5- 1
WT=_(±U)+rPT,
and
+ a2+ 7)(b2 + O+ r)-(ahs)2}_s(52+g+r) (32)
(b4b){(1 +ã2++r)_-(ä5_s)2}+r(j2+4+r)P-,-I.
232It is evident from (31) and (32) that additive uncertainty does not affect the
optima! policy rule. i.e. that the certainty equivalent theorem holds in thiscase.
When the uncertainty is restricted to the coefficient of the state variable, i.e.




As above, to determine the impact of this uncertainty we differentiateK with
respect to the variance of a,, and obtain
3K (ãbr+b2s)(b2+r)2
8o[b2{(1 + ä2+o-)(b2+r)(ãb _s)2}+r(b2+r)]2>-
As in section II above this implies a more vigorous policy response for uncertainty
of this type. However, if the inner product term is added as in (1) rather than
subtTacted as in (28), the denominator of (34) is given by (ãbr- b2s)(b2 + r)2 and
therefore iK/.3o> 0 only when s <ar/b, and negative otherwise. In those
instances when s=r, the sign of 3K/ao depends exclusively on whether or not
a>b.2
Returning again to the incomes policy model, it follows from(32) that if
uncertainty is restricted to the policy variable, i.e. if cr,=cr=0, that
1a6FsU2+r)}+{a&(1 +a2)_s}g
22 2 PT-I AP_1={2F+r(2+ r)}+F+2(1 +a2)+r}+(1 +a ))
The complexity of (35) precludes finding simple necessary and sufficient
conditions for determining the sign of 3A/&r. However, sufficient conditions can
be readily ascertained. In particular
aA/ao> 0. when ab(1 +a2)<s <a+f(1+a2)(b+ r)]"2.
This result is particularly interesting because when (36) holds, the conclusion
contradicts the findings of section II. Also since we have already shown that
äA/äo-is positive for the incomes policy model, it follows that uncertainty in
either a, or b, induces a more vigorous policy response. (Again no covariation is
assumed.) Furthermore, it is easy to demonstrate that plausible values of s do
satisfy (36). In particular, in the model employed in which a=0.77 and b0.23
and in which r=s, (36) is satisfied whenever 0.231.98. In addition we note
that this is a sufficient condition and that a larger interval might also satisfy (36).
In the more familiar case in which the inner product term is positive as in (1) a
simple sufficiency condition can be derived only for aA/3o <0. For this case
aA/acr<0, when ar/b <s <[(1 + a2)(b2+ r)]1"2ab.
In the common special case when a, b <1, the upper limit implies that s cannot be
significantly greater than r, if we wish to guarantee that aA/ao <0. Also for r
2This result is consistent with our earlier explanation. Encreasing a, while holding b, constant
implies via (1) thatx,1increases, which in turn implies a reduction in the absolute value of
233the lower bound condition of (37) again emphasizesthe importance of therelative magnitudes of a and b.
III. SUMMARY
The findings of the previous two sectionswere obtained for a singleequation model with a two period horizon. To illustratethat these Conclusionsare in
general transferable to systems characterized byan n period horizon (n >2)and simultaneous equations, some control simulationwere made for a simple 2











All of the results in Table Iare consistent with the findings in SectionII. A comparison of the results of simulations (2)and (3) with those ofsimulation (1) show that when uncertainty isrestricted to the A matrix, thatpolicy is pursued
more intensively than for the correspondingcertainty case. Similarly a compari-
son of row 5 with row 1 illustrates the lessvigorous response which ariseswhen
uncertainty is confined to the B matrix.The results of simulation 4demonstrate the substitution of policy I whenuncertainty is restricted to the coefficientof the latter. The other resultsare self explanatory.
TABLE I
UNCPRTAINTY AND FIRST PERIODPOLICY RESPONSES
When positive the varianceshave the (ollowing magnitudes = 120.09, oal,=0.02,, =0.2,020.2, a 9.O.






























policy intensity, welfare gains and policy instrument choice are all interrelated, it
seems reasonable to assume that this same course of action might also be advisable
prior to any judgment in these latter two areas.
University of Illinois
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APPENDIX
DERIVATION OFTHEOPTIMAL POLICY RULES FOR





s.t. XNI=Ax1 -1- Bu, + c.
A Necessary Relationship
E[x+1 Qx,1]= 1+1Qi,+ tr(QV1''),
where the ijth element of the matrix Vis given by
n.H = xV'x, + 2x' +2xV"+2i4 i-u,V'u,+V'





F(x)=Mm }E(x'7Q1x7 +x'1Sur + UrRUT + FT+I (X+ ))}
=Mm{xTOTXT + XSUT + U TRUT + E((x'I+I QT-f IXT+ 1)IXT)},
235which by (2), (3), and (4) yields
(6')Fr(XT)=Min{x 'TOTXT + UTRU-f X'ISUT
UT
+(AxT+ BUr+ CT) Q+ I(AxT+ JUT + CT)
+tr(QT+1 (x ITVAAXT + 2x 'I'V'UT + 2x 1T VAC+ 214 $1vc
,BB CC +UTI14r+V))}.
The value of UT which minimizes the right hand sideof (6') can be foundby setting i9{ }/au1-0. This yields the optimal policy rule,
UT =[RT+B'QT+IB+trQV1i'{B'QT+I(AxT+ëT)+(trQV48)1xT
+SxT+trQTf V.
Substituting (7) back into (6') yields thequadratic form
FT(xT)=x'KTxT+kTxT+hT,
where
(8a)KT QT+A'QT+IA +ITQTlV(A'QT+lA ±ST+(rQj7)[]'
XW'Q,-A + S11+ (trQT+1 V))
kTC7QT+IA +(ITQTI V)'(eQ1±(tQTlV)1)[J_1
x(E'QT+IA +S'1-+ (nQ.-1V)')
={ëQTf ICT + ITQT+l V+(CQT+ 1B + (trQT+ 1Vy)[ ]
',DQ- tiB <LJ T+ICT+1t'JrjV
The same procedure isrepeated for the new recursiveequation
FTI(xTl)= Mm E{(xjQTlxT_l+Xl_jStj+14-_iRUr_1 +FT(xl))}. UT_i
The only difference betweenthis new equation andequation (6) above is that FT(xT) given by (8) ismore complex thanFr+1(x+1) given by (5). Consequently, the structure of theoptimal policy rule derivedfrom (9) resembles that ofequation (7), but is modifiedto incorporate the differencejust cited. The derivedoptimal policy rule is givenas
U1-_1=[R1-_1
+S',-IXTI +B'kr+'jx+trKr7'9




- WT1('KTA + 5Ti +(u.K,V)')J,
=[A'- W_1 'J(K7ET_I + kT)+ WT_I ITKTV,
236with
WT_I(A'KTB + ST_I +IrKTVAR)[RT_I+13'K-1B+ IrKTV'f'.
Since the structural form of (11) is identical to that of (8), a repeatcd application of
the dynamic program analysis yields the same results. Consequently (10) and
(1 la) constitute the general form of the solution with t and1 replacing
respectively T and 7' 1 everywhere. The values of the shadow price variables, K,
and k,, for I=(T, T 1,..., 1) can be determined by solving (I Ia) recursively
given the boundary conditionsKTI = QT+Iand kT*l=0. Once these have been
identified, the policy rule given by (10) is determined.
lii, e.g., boththe Band Q matricesare 2X2, then the matrixgiven bythesymbol
UQr+1 Vis defined asirQV q11 + q12 VB2BI + q2, V"' + q22VBB2.
237